


Africa

July, 1960
Volume 5, Number 7

SPECIAL REPORT



The Republic of Somalia:

Africa's Most Homogeneous State?



By AL CASTAGNO

ON JULY 1, two other African territories pass over the threshold of colonial rule to enter upon independence—Somalia and British Somaliland. Somalia is the only other nation besides Libya to be created by fiat of the United Nations, and it is the only instance in which a Trustee Power was given a specific deadline for independence a decade in advance. Another unique feature of the Trusteeship Agreement with Italy was the establishment of a United Nations Advisory Council in the capital city to "aid and advise" the Administering Power during the preparatory period.

I. Somalia

Located in the eastern Horn of Africa, Somalia has a territory of 150,000 square miles and a population estimated at 1,300,000. Another 1,300,000 Somalis live in the territories of ex-British Somaliland, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and in the Northern Province of Kenya. Although 43 percent of the Somalis are nomads and 28 percent are seminomads, they constitute a more homogeneous ethnic, religious, and linguistic group than that of any other nation-state in Africa. The struggle for survival in a harsh environment has produced a segmented social sys-

tem and clan enmities, but a rudimentary national consciousness has persisted and the extremely individualistic Somali has always retained his identity—whether in Nairobi, London, Aden, or New York. The Somalis are in Africa, but not entirely of Africa: they originally came from Asia, and, in occupying the Horn of Africa, they gradually absorbed the resident Galla and Bantu into their own Somali culture.

Islam has also been a most important element in creating a Somali national consciousness, for all Somalis through ancestors trace their descent from the lineage of the Prophet. The religious confraternities and agricultural communities have done much to inculcate concepts which transcend the limits of clan particularism. Practically every manifestation against European and Ethiopian rule has been expressed in terms of Islamic solidarity. And Islam has been frequently in conflict with Ethiopian Coptic Christianity, which has itself constituted the nucleus of Ethiopian nationalism among the Amhara-Shoan ruling class.

Early Relations with the West

Somalia was first brought into contact with the West when Italy, during the partition of Africa, staked out a claim in the Horn. But during the first phase of Italian rule, 1885-1941, little was done to advance the Somalis politically or educationally.

The fascist regime made some attempts at economic change, but the main impact on modern developments came under the British occupation from 1941 to 1950. During this period, political organizations were permitted and a first effort was made to secularize education.

Italy returned in 1950 as the Trustee Power with instructions from the United Nations General Assembly to build a modern state within a decade. Many doubted that it could be done. The first four years were marked with considerable acrimony between the administering authority and the Somali Youth League. But the Somali Youth League's victory in the 1954 municipal elections, combined with the urgency of the timetable, brought about a degree of harmony and cooperation between the party and the administration during the remaining period of the Trusteeship.

In the main, the Italian Administration, at times prodded by the UN, has stuck to the timetable of devolving authority; indeed, the target date of independence was advanced six months—from December 1960 to July. By 1956, practically all posts in the public service (now consisting of 11,120 Somalis, including the police, and 584 Italians) were somalized, and by 1959 command over the police was transferred to Somali officers. The training of foreign service personnel, however, came late. Only in the last

few years were attempts made to train Somali officials for diplomatic posts.

Progress in Education

Perhaps the most important contribution of the Trustee Power has been in the field of education. Only a few schools existed in 1950. Today there are about 160 primary schools with 15,982 day pupils and 18,156 adult pupils, eight secondary schools with 1,670 pupils, and nine vocational and professional schools with an enrollment of 1,376. Many serious problems remain to be solved, however. In the primary schools, for example, drop-outs are high because of the pastoral nature of Somali society; enrollment in secondary schools is only 6.25 percent of primary school enrollment; and the teacher training program is still inadequate to meet the needs of education.

But the most urgent problem is the lack of a national written language. The government is now seeking to produce a Latin script for the Somali language; if successful, this will replace Italian and Arabic which have heretofore been used as the official written languages.

An important recent development is the establishment of a two-year University Institute, with a faculty of 18 full-time and part-time instructors and a student body of 85. Presently linked with the University of Rome, which grants two years of credit to the Institute's graduates, it is in a state of gradual expansion. As far as overseas training is concerned, there are now about 200 students in Italy, 232 in Egypt, 25 in the United States, 15 in the Soviet Union, and eight in England.

By 1962 there should be approximately 200 university graduates in all fields in Somalia. But since the number is still inadequate to meet the technical and professional needs of the country, particularly in law and medicine, Italy has offered to help fill the gap by extending 80 to 100 scholarships to Somali students and by supplying 250 technical ex-

Somali schoolboys enjoy one of the country's important agricultural products, bananas.



Aerial view of Mogadiscio

-UN

perts. In addition, Egypt, the United States, Great Britain, and the UN will continue their scholarship programs for Somali students.

Economic Prospects Reevaluated

With the exception of the area between the two rivers, the Uebi Scebeli and the Giuba, the whole Somali-inhabited area of the Horn is semi-arid. The irregularity and paucity of the rainfall and the low levels of the two rivers limit agricultural development. There are no large industries in the area, and those which exist, mainly in Somalia, help to serve internal markets or provide for the processing and packaging of agricultural exports. Somalia's main export items—bananas and livestock products, which together constitute about 70 percent of exports—depend on world prices and demands, and, crucially, on protected markets in Italy. No exploitable mineral resources have yet been discovered, and despite the exploratory activities of three oil companies in the past six years, petroleum has not been found.

Despite these handicaps, some notable achievements have been made during the past decade. Agricultural production has been increased, food processing industries have been expanded, and a program of well-drilling and water storage has aided livestock raising. The Administration, with the assistance of ICA, has provided irrigation facilities for some 131,000 acres of agricultural land. The value of exports has steadily increased, and the gap between expenditures and revenue has been narrowed. Both the currency and the price level have been stable. The Somali Credit Institute (*Credito Somalo*) was established in 1954 to advance loans to small industries and agriculture and the Institute has recently been granted \$2,000,000 credit by the US Development Loan Fund. The number of Somali entrepreneurs has increased by one-fourth during this period, although most of the cash crop concessions and industries remain in Italian hands. With the ICA aid, the Somali Government is taking the first step

toward a major expansion of port facilities at Chisimaio (which serves the agricultural region of the Giuba) and at Mogadiscio.

Italy has spent about \$100,000,000 in the territory since 1950. The United States has granted and loaned Somalia \$7,600,000 exclusive of expenditures for American ICA personnel; and total aid from the UN and its agencies has come to roughly \$700,000. Egypt last year spent \$545,000 for educational, medical, and technical assistance programs. This overall estimate of aid does not include the indirect assistance which

The Author

Al Castagno, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Queens College in New York, is generally recognized as the leading American authority on the Horn of Africa. His most recent trip to the area was under an 18-month Ford grant. Dr. Castagno is the author of a booklet, Somalia, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and of numerous articles on the area. He also lectures frequently on African affairs and is a consultant for several organizations.

Italy has supplied by absorbing Somalia's exports on a protective basis. Somalia is expected to have an annual deficit in its public budget of \$5,000,000 for at least the next several years and a similar deficit in the balance of payments.

How Much Outside Aid?

Clearly, Somalia will be dependent on outside aid for some time to come. Although the government has tried to increase the sources of direct taxes and reduce the deficits, revenue is still derived mainly from indirect taxes (63 percent) and monopolies (10 percent). Direct taxes have provided only about 13 percent of total revenue. When and if the banana industry can be put on a more economic basis, agriculture diversified, secondary industries increased, and expensive foreign civil servants replaced by Somalis, there will be a real chance of obtaining a balance. Improved tax collection methods and



an expansion of direct taxes could increase revenue, but these must be viewed as long-range measures in a country where the annual per capita income is below \$45. Italy, the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, and the UN agencies have indicated that they will continue to grant financial and technical assistance. The European Common Market has committed itself to the extent of \$5,000,000 for the period 1958-1962. Thus, enough funds *may* be avail-

charcoal industries can be organized along more modern lines. But much will depend on the world demand-and-supply cycle and on long-range foreign investments. The government has taken a major step toward encouraging foreign investments by passing a liberal law which guarantees property rights, repatriation of capital, and transfer of profits. But the economic development will also depend on the *elan vital*—the will of the people to transform the

While political sagacity and leadership ability are not dependent on formal education, education or professionalism is important in the administrative hierarchy. Thus, it is in the top-level administrative posts of the civil service that one finds many of those who have received some degree of higher education. The government is also absorbing most of those students returning from foreign universities. A real shortage still exists in the administrative area, but African governments, notably Ghana, have been able to employ expatriate civil service personnel without seriously compromising the independence of their political decisions.


Outlook for Democracy

More problematical, however, is the running of a modern state along western democratic lines.

In the March 1959 elections, the Somali Youth League secured 83 seats in the Legislative Assembly; the Somali Independent Constitutional Party, five; and the Youth Party, two. Since then, the latter group has gone over to the Somali Youth League; and the top leaders of the Independent Constitutional Party, who since 1957 have had an increasingly pro-government orientation, have joined with the Somali Youth League in its major policy objectives.

It seems likely that the Somali Youth League will continue to dominate the politics of Somalia for some time to come. Not only has the League constituted the only effective, nationally organized party since 1947—although it became lethargic from 1956 to 1959—but it has consistently

(Continued on page 8)



Voters take a serious view of things in Hargeisa, ex-British Somaliland.

—Castagno

able: the problem is whether, given the diverse sources of aid, the economic programs can be efficiently coordinated and implemented.

Somalis Are Confident

In its 1956 report on Somalia, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development pointed to the limitations on the country's economic growth. The UN Advisory Council, however, notes in its 1960 annual report that the Bank's appraisal seems to have been pessimistic and suggests that reevaluation of the economic potentials of the new Somalia is in order. Somalis themselves feel confident that there can be an expansion of economic activities and that, generally, western observers have been unduly pessimistic. Both the Trustee Power and the UN Advisory Council agree that the potential growth in the agricultural sector is greater than the past decade of economic development suggests.

Output of livestock products, particularly hides, skins, and tinned meat can be expanded. The fish resources of the surrounding sea remain to be tapped. The tuna industry can expand, and the incense and

means and techniques of production as much as the environment will allow.

Political Prospects

The men who will guide Somalia through the first years of independence are by no means political novices. Since 1956 the Somalia Government has had almost complete control over domestic matters and the March 1959 elections returned to office the majority of those who had served in the previous cabinet and Legislative Assembly. Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa, President of the Legislative Assembly Aden Abdullah, Minister of Public Works Mohamud Abdi Nur, Minister of Industry and Commerce Hagi Farah Ali Omar, and many others have been intimately involved with the governmental processes since the establishment of the territorial council in 1950. The majority of the 20-odd ministers and undersecretaries have received little formal education, since education was confined to a few mission schools prior to 1940. In the main, their training ground has been the rough and tumble of the struggle for independence and political power.

AFRICA SPECIAL REPORT is published monthly at Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.

Cable: AFRAM, WASHINGTON

Editorial Staff:

Helen Kitchen, Editor
Gayle Quisenberry, Editorial Assistant
Margaret O'Neill, Circulation
Harvey Glickman, Book Editor
Okon Idem, Library

Africa Special Report welcomes but cannot assume responsibility for unsolicited manuscripts.

© The African-American Institute, Inc., 1960

Articles in Africa Special Report are independently selected and edited by the editor and do not necessarily reflect the views of the African-American Institute.

Second Class postage paid at Washington, D. C. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE:
Surface mail: U. S. \$1.00; Foreign 8/.
Air Rates: U. S. \$3.00; Foreign \$4.90.

News Review

African Political Leaders Confer in Addis Ababa

Thirteen high level representatives of Africa's independent and near-independent states ended a spirited 11-day Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa on June 24. It was a meeting marked by a broad range of agreement on cooperative approaches to Africa's economic problems and the quest for continent-wide independence, but also by some sharp exchanges on the classic area and ideological differences which hamper the development of a single African voice. The conferees, mostly Foreign Ministers, took these decisions:

- Unanimously agreed that member countries should boycott South African goods, close their ports and airfields to South African transport, and press the British Commonwealth to take all possible steps to secure the exclusion of the Union from the Commonwealth. (However, the United Arab Republic—irritated by the failure of the Conference to endorse an Egyptian proposal to sever African ties with Israel—declined to close the Suez Canal to South African ships, on the grounds that the Canal is an international waterway with international obligations.)
- Demanded that the British Government take immediate steps to dissolve the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
- Decided to establish a special fund to aid "freedom fighters" in Africa.
- Recommended the establishment of a "Council of African Economic Cooperation" to organize the establishment of a joint African development bank and a joint African commercial bank, as well as devise other cooperative means of implementing and maintaining African economic unity.
- Recommended continued diplomatic and material support for the Algerian rebels.
- Failed to enact into a resolution Ghana Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah's call for endorsement in principle of the concept of a United States of Africa. (Maitama Sule, the chief delegate from Nigeria, led the opposition, describing plans for African union as premature and dangerous; he called instead for a loose association of states as proposed by President William V. Tubman of Liberia.)
- Listened with interest to Tanganyika delegate Julius Nyerere's proposal for a loose pre-independence federation of Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda.

Lumumba Becomes First Premier Of a Congo Republic Still Intact

The July 6 mutiny of Congolese soldiers against expatriate officers of the 25,000-man Congolese national army occurred just as this issue of *Africa Special Report* was going to press. The forthcoming August issue will carry an analysis of the root causes of the uprising and a new look at the shaken Congo's political prospects.

The coalition cabinet which Premier Patrice Lumumba has brought together in the Congo is one of the most extraordinary in the annals of parliamentary history. A tenuous grouping of political expediency, it contains a grand total of 23 posts, distributed among 12 different political parties. The average age of the members is about 35, and none has had legislative experience above the town council level. The only university-trained members are Minister of Foreign Affairs Justin Bomboko and Delegate to the United Nations Thomas Kanza.

Nevertheless, the new government bears the mark of political genius, for only a most skillful and astute politician, possessing an important measure of indefinable charisma, could have molded the diverse and centrifugal political formations of the Congo into a centrally-oriented working unit in so short a time without the use of force. Mr. Lumumba has, moreover, bargained and cajoled his rivals into joining with him without sacrificing any of the four key positions he sought for his own party—the Premiership and the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Economic Coordination.

Despite their inexperience, the

tration's favorite son. Once the ramifications of a defeat for Kasavubu on this issue became clear, however, Lumumba persuaded his followers to forget the bitter words between the ABAKO leader and the MNC during the recent campaign and back Kasavubu for the position of head of state.

"Although Mr. Kasavubu could not command sufficient national support to be able to sway Parliament," wrote *Scotsman* correspondent George Clay from Leopoldville on June 25, "he did have enough strength in Leopoldville to be able to hold the country to ransom by crippling its commercial and administrative capital and sealing off the mouth of the Congo river, its main highway." Mr. Lumumba, conscious of the danger of a violent outbreak in Leopoldville by Mr. Kasavubu's supporters if he were not given some suitably high office, decided it was time to bury the hatchet.

While many tensions and jealousies are likely to develop in a cabinet of this jerry-built nature when it gets down to the task of defining working policies and making day-to-day decisions, only three groups can be described as seriously disgruntled at the outset. One is the CONAKAT, the principal political grouping in miner-

"Our primary concern will be justice and progress; there will be no dictatorship . . . We have been united in our struggle against the past colonial regime. We have been united at the roundtable conference. In today's triumph, we stand again united. We have a strong, honest, popular government . . . More than ever, we now need Belgian help. Members of the colonial administration will remain in the Congo to help us with their experience and advice. Religious missions will receive a guarantee permitting them to continue their task . . . We want to maintain friendly relations with all nations and we will join neither of the two blocs now dividing the world. In international relations, we will fight for freedom . . ."

Premier Patrice Lumumba, speaking to a joint session of the Congo Parliament on June 24, 1960.

Congo's politicians under Mr. Lumumba's leadership resolved the deadlock between Jean Bolikango of the *Parti Unite Nationale Africaine* and Joseph Kasavubu of the ABAKO over the presidency of the republic with a demonstration of rare political sophistication. Initially, Lumumba had declared his support for Bolikango, who was also the Belgian adminis-

als-rich Katanga province, where there is new talk of secession if Lumumba does not increase CONAKAT representation in the cabinet.

Moise Tshombe, spokesman for the Katanga movement, anticipated that his party would receive at least three major ministries, but the Cabinet as initially formulated contained only one CONAKAT appointee—the Minister

News Review

of Economic Affairs. Moreover, the importance of this post was cut down considerably when it became known that there would also be a Minister of Economic Coordination and Planning, to be held by a representative of Lumumba's *MNC*; a Minister of Mines; a Minister of External Commerce; and a Minister of Finance. The future course of *CONAKAT*'s policy toward the central government may depend, in large part, on the advice which Mr. Tshombe gets from the powerful Belgian mining concern, *Union Minière du Katanga*.

Coalition is Fragile

The other elements which promise to give Mr. Lumumba some trouble include Bolikango's followers, who are naturally angry at Lumumba's last-minute switch to support Kasavubu for chief of state, and Albert Kalonji's dissident wing of the *MNC*, which was the only major party unrepresented among the original Cabinet appointments. Kalonji has said there would be "serious trouble" if Lumumba came to power, but Kalonji's strength is limited largely to the Baluba peoples of his native Kasai province, and his election alliances with other parties have largely foundered.

The election of Kasavubu to be chief of state may not be enough to satisfy the *ABAKO* either, for one Ministry (Finance) and two sub-cabinet posts would not seem adequate

reward for the party which polled the third largest number of votes in the recent elections.

Like many of his nationalist predecessors in Africa, Lumumba's post-election statements (see quotations on the preceding page) have a decidedly less radical ring than those of a few months ago. But he still has far to go in burying the suspicions of many of his colleagues that his aim is highly personalized power.

Five More African States Become Independent

The map of Africa underwent major changes this month as five more states gained independence:

- June 20—The Mali Federation of Senegal and Sudan
- June 26—The Indian Ocean island of Madagascar, officially renamed the Malagasy Republic
- June 26—British Somaliland (subsequently united on July 1 with the Republic of Somalia)
- June 30—The Belgian Congo, to be officially renamed the Republic of Congo
- July 1—the Italian-administered UN Trust Territory of Somalia, now named the Republic of Somalia

Kenya Narrowly Averts New Political Impasse

What looked like an impending impasse in the chess game between the Kenya Government and the newly-formed Kenya African National Union has been averted, for the present at least, by compromises on both sides. KANU has withdrawn its proposal to name Jomo Kenyatta as president *in absentia* and has deleted a controversial clause in its constitution authorizing the affiliation of trade unions to the organization. And the government, on its part, has accorded the new party the official recognition it needs to begin establishing a colony-wide organization in anticipation of the 1961 general elections.

Africans Drop Threat

In addition, the KANU leadership—which include a major share of the principal contenders for power in Kenya—dropped the threat of a mass resignation of African-elected members from the Legislature shortly before the June 15 deadline, despite the fact that the government did not meet KANU'S exact terms concerning consultations with the exiled Kenyatta. The KANU executive had originally demanded that all African-elected members, as well as party officials not included in this category, should make the pilgrimage; however, it has now been accepted that the initial visit to see Kenyatta at Lodwar, in the remote Northern Frontier Province, will be made only by the three African Ministers of the Kenya Government—Dr. J. G. Kiano, Ronald Ngala, and J. N. Muimi.

James Gichuru, who was named acting president of the incipient Kenya African National Union on May 15, with the clear understanding that he was only "keeping the seat warm" for Jomo Kenyatta, has now been officially designated as head of the party. Other elected officials include Oginga Odinga, vice-president; Tom Mboya, general secretary; and Arthur Ochwada, one of Mboya's bitterest critics, deputy general secretary. Dr. Mungai Njoroge, the Kikuyu physician who not long ago returned from seven years in the United States and was secretary of the committee which drew up the new KANU constitution, has not yet been named to a party post, though some observers in Nairobi see him as potentially a formidable force.

On June 25, five Kenya political parties which have failed to answer the KANU call for a merger of all groups into a monolithic independence movement joined forces to establish a rival Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Participating groups include the Kalenjin Alliance, representing the five Kalenjin-speaking

Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba (right) and President Joseph Kasavubu agree to cooperate in the new Congo government. —Wide World



tribes of northwest Kenya; the Masai United Front; the Coast African People's Union, whose organizational meeting on June 12 was chaired by Minister of Labor Ronald Ngala, who represents Mombasa in the Legislative Council and recently declined election as treasurer of KANU; Masinde Muliro's Kenya African People's Party; and the Somali National Association.

Review of Federation Set Back to February?

The Commonwealth Affairs correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph* reported on June 6 that the review of the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is now not expected to begin before February 1961. Original plans called for the full-scale review to begin in October of this year, immediately at the end of the minimum seven-year period laid down in the constitution.

Meanwhile, the constitutional conference on Nyasaland, at which Dr. Hastings Banda will be the key figure, is scheduled to begin in London on July 25. The Monckton Commission's Report is expected in September or October.

"Business-As-Usual" Is South African Aim

The South African Government appeared this month to be returning to a business-as-usual attitude. These were the major developments:

- Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, making his first appearance since being shot, told a Union Day audience in Bloemfontein on May 31 that the oldest Nationalist goal, creation of a republic, was near achievement. He did not specify when the referendum on republican status would be held, but August was believed a likely time.
- Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the Opposition, disputed the government's view that the Commonwealth would want to keep its present ties with South Africa if the change were made from a monarchy to a republic. Dr. Jan Steytler, Progressive Party leader, agreed with Graaff that a change of governmental form at this time would give the Union's enemies a long-awaited chance to push her out of the Commonwealth.
- The government meanwhile continued to encourage immigration, a policy it had scorned before March, with special welcome for whites leaving other African countries. There

\$1,500,000 for African Education?

A \$1,500,000 program to analyze and then help fill the educational needs of an emerging Africa was presented to the United Nations' 14-man Trusteeship Council on June 18 by a spokesman for the UN's Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Dr. Matta Akrawi of Iraq, speaking for UNESCO, described these conditions in 22 tropical African states:

- Only one of every three children of primary school age is being educated. In other words, there are 17,000,000 African children of primary school age who are not in school.
- It will require the recruitment of at least 350,000 teachers to educate these children.
- In secondary education, less than half of the "target" enrollment—estimated at 10 percent of the primary school enrollment—is now being educated, or a total of about 256,000 pupils.

The two-part program proposed by Dr. Akrawi to help Africa bring itself abreast of its responsibilities in the educational field will be outlined in detail at UNESCO's November meeting in Paris. The first phase, analysis of the problem, would cost an estimated \$300,000, while the actual provision of needed direct technical assistance could run to \$1,130,000.

were indications that immigrants might be subsidized.

- The only major step that could be interpreted as a reaction to the disturbances was a plan announced by Prime Minister Verwoerd June 2 to subsidize new industries near the borders of the reserves. Such industries, the Prime Minister said, would provide income for reserve Africans and thus speed the development of Bantustans. Urban industrialists were sharply critical of the scheme.

• Among the Africans in Pondoland, rioting broke out repeatedly in protest against the Bantu authorities the government has set up. Estimates of deaths from one major clash with the police ranged from six, the government figure, to 29. The tribesmen were armed with guns (legal in the bush) and assegais.

• The government cited the widely-publicized movements to boycott South African goods as a reason for some domestic belt-tightening. Minister of Transport Ben Schoeman, for example, explained a refusal to raise railway wages June 7 by saying that the Union's "economic position in the next six or seven months is an unknown factor." "We do not know," he added, "whether these boycott movements are going to develop and strike a blow at our economy."

• The United Nations announced June 23 that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld would shortly travel to South Africa for the consultations the Security Council had instructed him to undertake. He was to arrive July 22, and the Afro-Asian UN bloc was expected to press him for an early report.

Obote's Congress May Join New Uganda Union

A new and potentially important political union was launched in Uganda on June 21. Although the leadership of the movement, to be called the United National Party, is almost entirely confined to persons from Buganda Province and has been nicknamed the party of "insiders" or office holders, observers in Kampala believe that it is the only likely formation so far to bridge the gap between separatist-minded Buganda and the other three provinces of Uganda, and to weld traditionalists and modern nationalists into a workable independence movement.

The new party absorbs the former Uganda National Party and the United Party, and hopes to achieve a merger shortly with A. M. Obote's Uganda People's Congress; certain prominent trade unionists are also involved. Founder members include two Ministers in the Protectorate Government, Apollo Kironde (president), and Y. K. Lule. Abu Mayanja, presently Minister of Education in Buganda Province and formerly closely associated with Mr. Obote in the Congress, is publicity secretary of the new grouping.

The general aims of the party are said to be (1) independence "as soon as possible," (2) reduction of the number of parties in Uganda, (3) preservation of the institution of kingship in the kingdom states, and (4) a composite form of government incorporating the best in the federal and unitary systems, "with a bias toward the federal."

The "Other" Somalias: Proceed

THE 1949 UN resolution which established independence for Somalia by 1960 provided the tangible basis of the Pan-Somali movement. The resolution was restricted to Somalia, but it was illogical to assume that the application of the principle of self-government could be confined to "Italian" Somalis. Events in ex-British Somaliland suggest that proper adjectives, such as "British", which have been used in the past to designate a particular kind of "Somali", are purely artificial. This is symbolically revealed in the five-pointed white star of the Somali flag in which each point represents a Somali-inhabited territory. Kenya, French Somaliland, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia are the remaining three points of attention.

KENYA

British jurisdiction over the Somali areas is now confined to the 80,000-odd Somalis who inhabit the desiccated Northern Province of Kenya. The Somalis there are relatively late arrivals, having pushed back the Boran and other Kenyan tribes until 1909 when the Administration established the limits of their migratory movement. The Kenyan-Ethiopian boundary, drawn in 1902-1903, also cuts across Somali ethnic groups and is marked by raids and disputes. Whereas relations between Somali administrative officials (of Somalia) and Kenyan district officers have been amicable, those between Ethiopians and Kenyans have long been characterized by mutual recriminations.

Neither the political nor the socio-economic development of the Somalis in the Northern Province compares with that in Somalia or Somaliland. One reason may be that the Kenyan Government has proscribed political parties in the Northern Province and has stressed the role of chiefs. There are no organs of local government and Somali representation is confined to one seat in the Legislative Council. Musa Geled, the president of the Somali National Association in Nairobi (a recent fusion of the Darod and Ishaak associations), has asked for increased representation, but this is no longer a main issue. The question now is whether the Somalis will accept an African government in Kenya. Somali chiefs in the Northern Province who met with Kenya's Governor Sir Patrick Renison during his recent tour of the region stated that they will join Somalia if Kenya gains independence under an African government. This is in line with the traditional Somali posi-

tion in Kenya that Somalis be classified as "non-Africans."

White Kenyans have held some apprehension about the implications of a Pan-Somali movement in their territory. The East African *Standard* commented on November 9, 1959 that Somalia's independence "contains a potential threat to our northern frontiers." On the other hand, a growing number of white Kenyans take the view that nothing can be gained from resisting Somali nationalism. Kenya's African leaders have not stated their position, but it can be assumed that some difficulties will be confronted in any negotiation over this question, despite the fact that the region has little economic value. If the Kenyan Somalis should be brought into the Somali state, the immediate problem would be that of providing progressive administration in a territory where expenditures are certain to exceed revenue.

FRENCH SOMALILAND

Whereas the problem of Britain in Somaliland has been how to withdraw gracefully, the problem of France in the *Cote française des Somalis* is how to remain. This enclave of 5,800 square miles, which came under French authority in 1884, is regarded by the French Government as having major strategic value. The estimated population of 67,000 is roughly broken down into 3,000 French, 28,000 Dankali, 30,000 Somalis (who claim close ethnic affinity with the Dankali), and 6,000 Arabs. President Charles De Gaulle, in his visit to the territory in 1959, stressed France's intention to retain control. This was repeated a few months ago when the Governor, Jacques Compain, noted that France was not hostile to a British Somaliland-Somalia union, but that "if certain leaders venture into expansionist dreams they will find themselves up against our fixed determination." The main reason for this stand is the port of Djibouti, which is France's only naval base in the East African-Middle Eastern area. In addition, Djibouti is an important commercial port which acts as the terminus of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway (completed in 1917). In 1959 a Franco-Ethiopian treaty granted Ethiopia free use of the port and transferred a majority control of the railway from the French to the Ethiopians.

It is difficult to determine the exact degree of Pan-Somali sentiment among the French Somalis. In the

Republic of Somalia

(Continued from page 4)

attracted the most intelligent and vigorous of the youth.

While it is doubtful that there will emerge an effective "Opposition" party in Parliament, opposition and criticism there will be—essentially within the governing party itself. Major issues are discussed in the Legislative Assembly, but both initiative and decisions come from the cabinet. Various procedures, such as conferences of district commissioners and regional commissioners, permit frequent debates of policy directions. State issues are also threshed out in the Central Committee of the Somali Youth League. Western critics might find all

this a dubious kind of democracy since it is at odds with the concept of impermanence of the government and with the assumption that an opposition party can one day become the government. But in Somalia, as in most of Africa, opposition parties are often not constructive and they sometimes tend to enervate the drive toward national unity.

Government by "Tribal Balance"

Another aspect of the Somali political system is clanism. Somalia is comprised of three main clan-family units—the Darod, who inhabit northern Somalia and southern Somalia, the Hawiye, who inhabit the Hiran region and part of the Mudugh, and the Rahanwein and Dighil, who occupy the region between the two

ivers. The Independent Constitutional Party derives entirely from the last group; the Somali Youth League is composed of the first two and some elements of the Rahanwein. The Greater Somalia League, founded by an ex-president of the Somali Youth League, Haji Mohammed Hussein, ostensibly to push the Greater Somalia goal, has sought to capitalize on Darod disenchantment with the distribution of government posts. Disagreements which have their origin in traditional factors are often reflected in modern politics. Both the government crises of 1957 and 1959 may be traced to Darod-Hawiye rivalry.

But to overemphasize these factors is to miss the significance of the

pects for Unity

1958 referendum, about 75 percent of the population voted for the "overseas territory" status. The vote has been contested by Mahmoud Harbi, the former premier, holder of a *Croix de Guerre*, and an ardent Pan-Somali advocate. After the referendum, Harbi was reconfirmed by the Territorial Assembly, but soon afterward he was deposed. New elections were held in November 1958, the French Governor was replaced, and Hassan Gouled, leader of the Party for the Defense of Economic and Social Interests, formed a pro-French coalition. Harbi's *Union Republicaine* was fractionalized and some of its leaders went to Mogadiscio to take part in the Pan-Somali movement.

While in Mogadiscio, Harbi presided over the Pan-Somali Nationalist Movement, organized in October 1959 to seek through peaceful means the unification of all Somali-inhabited areas. But his extremism soon became unpalatable to the moderate Issa government and he was required to relinquish his position. Harbi may now be coveting leadership of a Greater Somalia with its capital to be located at Djibouti. Presently he is in Communist China seeking support for a Greater Somalia along his terms or an independent French Somaliland. Harbi's shift from being pro-French to embracing the Chinese Communists may be indicative of what could happen if Pan-Somali nationalism is not accommodated.

Given the multi-ethnic character of the territory and the economic advantages which derive from maintaining the *status quo*, there may be no early manifestation for uniting with the other two Somali regions. But events are moving too rapidly to permit the luxury of predictions. Presently, the French hope to deflect a demand for independence by Africanizing, for the first time, the civil service. A degree of autonomy in domestic affairs already exists in the application of the *Loi Cadre*. That Ethiopia is equally concerned with developments in the territory was clearly indicated when Ethiopian troops were moved up to the border at the time of the referendum.

ETHIOPIA

Somalis regard Ethiopia as the *bete noire* of the Greater Somalia scheme, since it has been the power most antagonistic to the movement. Addis Ababa interpreted Britain's grant of independence to Somaliland as "a veiled attempt to revive and strengthen her



colonial bastion on the Ethiopian border" (*Ethiopian Herald*, February 13, 1959), and has remonstrated both with Britain and the United States for having allowed such a situation to occur. Emperor Haile Selassie's trip to Europe and to the Soviet Union in 1959 can be interpreted as a more tangible form of protest.

The reasons for Ethiopian opposition to Somali unification are many. Ethiopia has long viewed the Somali lowlands as "our lost provinces." Although this view does not comport with historical data, it sets the psychological climate within which Ethiopia conceptualizes its policy toward the Somali regions. The paternalistic tone of Ethiopian admonitions to Somalis to "join your brothers" has only further antagonized Somali attitudes toward Ethiopian objectives.

But most important of all, Ethiopian apprehension over the Pan-Somali movement derives from the fact that within Ethiopian borders—in the Ogaden region—there are some 500,000 (or more) Somalis who are sensitive to developments in the Somali state. Loyalties may be divided among Ogaden Somalis, for both economic survival and political expediency are important considerations; moreover, Ethiopian forces at Jigjiga and Harar are poised to deal with any revolt. But the Pan-Somali sentiment still raises an important challenge. It is feared that a separatist movement among the Somalis might have a disintegrating effect on the Ethiopian empire (whose population is 40 percent Muslim), particularly if the question of imperial succession should accentuate the centrifugal forces. Given these factors, the boundary claims can become a source of hostilities between the two states.

transition which has taken place; if national exigencies and political expediencies so require, clan considerations can be overridden, at least on a *modus vivendi* basis. In fact, one of the main contributions of the Somali Youth League is that it has striven to mollify clan cleavages.

Nonetheless, as in most of Africa, the tribal factor will remain an important one in Somali political life so long as the socio-economic basis of the country is not seriously altered. A positive way of dealing with the fact of tribalism without at the same time abandoning efforts at detribalization may be found in the present formula of "tribal balance" in government—that is, ministerial and under-

secretary posts are distributed among modernist, non-tribal political leaders on a basis of one third for each main clan-family group.

Some Somalis regard the arrangement as a reversion to tribalism. But by no means is "tribal balance" an irrevocable commitment to tribalism. The powers of the traditionalists (khadis and "chiefs") are being reduced by the ever-increasing powers of central and local government; the *arifato* (customary law in which one clan is in a client relationship to another) has been outlawed; and parliament has passed a resolution urging the abolishment "of any further claim to collective property." The governing party anticipates that

the economic and educational programs will gradually break down those traditional concepts and practices which are viewed as antithetical to the modern state. In essence, Somalia is only doing informally that which Nigeria has done constitutionally; that is, it has accepted the fact that clan (or regional) differences constitute a political reality.

Compromise is the Key

Where clanism persists in modern government, political stability hinges on the ability of the political leaders to compromise competing clan claims and to balance delicately both modernist and traditional forces. The ability to compromise and balance,

rather than the element of charismatic leadership, is a main prerequisite for governing. For if "tribal balance" is to work effectively, it must take into account the claims of those clan groups which have held reservations about the distribution of patronage and unequal participation in the decision-making processes of government. The union with British Somaliland poses new and difficult problems for the balancers.

Some Somali intellectuals also look upon "tribal balance" as a check on authoritarian one-man rule. Certainly, one of the interesting features of Abdullahi Issa's premiership since 1956 has been the absence of adulation or charisma that surrounds many Asian and African political leaders. Nor has Issa's leadership been characterized by such devices as negative militancy toward ephemeral "anti-imperialist" issues. Apart from the inter-party struggles, the course of the Somali Youth League Government has been consistently moderate and responsible.

Role of the Military

Two institutions of special importance in Somalia are the Somali Police Force and the Somali National Army. The former, now numbering some 3,800 men, was built around a nucleus of the British-organized and trained Somali Gendarmerie between 1941 and 1945. A crack unit of the Italian Carabinieri was responsible for molding it into a highly disciplined organization. Its non-partisanship and its effectiveness were proved during the political disturbances of 1959. Colonel Mohammed Abshir Mussa, the commandant, is respected equally in British Somaliland and in Somalia, and by Europeans and Somalis alike. The Army was created in May 1960 and will consist of 5,000 men. It is led by Colonel Daud Abdullah, who served with the British Somali Gendarmerie during the British occupation, as did Police Commandant Mussa.

Islam and Politics

Somali identification with Islam is reflected in both external and internal politics. The vigorous Somali protests against English, French, and Israeli actions during the Suez crisis are one indication of the nation's orientation and its cultural links with the Middle East. But increasingly the elite is looking also to the West and to Africa for new directions. Since 1958, Somali political leaders have been exhorting the people to recognize themselves as African and to abandon the belief of Asian descent.

The recent emphasis on Africa, encouraged mainly by Somalis educated in the west, was due to both psychological and political motivations. Psychologically, it helps to fulfill the need of reconstructing a new Somali per-

Somalia's Leaders...

Newly chosen President of the joint Somalia Republic and former President of the Somalia Legislative Assembly, ADEN ABDULLAH OSMAN, 52, is warm, quiet, moderate, and skillful in reconciling disputes. From 1929 to 1941, he worked in various capacities with the Italian Administration. He was president of the Somali Youth League from 1954 to 1956 and took over again in 1958 after his successor, Hagi Mohammed Hussein, was expelled for pursuing an extremist policy. During the trusteeship period, Osman served as vice-president of the Territorial Council and as president of the Legislative Assembly. In foreign affairs, he is a "neutralist" with inclination toward the West.



Aden Abdullah Osman



Hagi Farah Ali Omar



Abdullahi Issa

Somalia's Prime Minister, ABDULLAHI ISSA, typifies the Somali political elite—young (age 38), intelligent, largely self-educated, confident, and determined. Hand-picked by the governing Somali Youth League's founder, Yassin Hagi Osman, to succeed him as the Secretary General of the party, he held this post from 1947 to 1953 and was the party's spokesman at the United Nations when it discussed the fate of Somalia in 1948-49. He has been Prime Minister since 1956. Although Issa was initially the most ardent anti-Italian among his League colleagues, his administration has been characterized by moderation and by cooperation with the Italian Administration. The Somalia Prime Minister has no flare for oratory and has made no attempt to build up a personality cult around himself. His primary objective, he says, is to "reduce the deficit."

HAGI FARAH ALI OMAR, Somalia's main spokesman on foreign affairs at the UN, was born in 1907 and served in the Italian Administration. He joined the Somali Youth League in 1945 and joined with Issa in 1948 in demanding independence for Somalia and opposing the return of Italian authority. He was Secretary General of the SYL from 1953-1956, Minister of Economics from 1956-1959, and is now Minister of Industry and Commerce. From 1957 to 1960, he has been the unofficial Somali representative to the United Nations. Like Issa and Osman he received his education in the Koranic and government elementary schools.

sonality; politically it identifies Somali unification aims with African aims. At the recent Tunis All African People's Conference, Somalis were able to secure a majority behind their resolution calling for a unification of all Somalis by "peaceful and legal means." A similar resolution was accepted at the 1957 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Cairo.

Modern nationalism and pan-Africanism have led Somali leaders to define their foreign policy as one of "positive neutralism," despite economic dependence on the west and the influence exerted by Egypt in the cultural sphere. Foreign policy, however, is never a unilateral matter; much depends on the policies of other powers. Egypt, France, Britain, the United States, Italy, and the Soviet

Union have all expressed their interest in the Horn.

US Policy Undefined

The role of the United States has yet to be defined. But making a commitment is no easy matter in an area marked by conflicting nationalistic claims. The vigorous Ethiopian reaction to our position on British Somaliland suggests the precariousness of being identified with Somali irredentism in the Ethiopian Ogaden and in French Somaliland. But should the Pan-Somali sentiment envelop these areas, it seems it would be even more precarious to resist it. No matter what policy is pursued, there are incalculable risks—particularly since the USSR is certain to increase its activities in the Horn.

II. Somaliland

British Somaliland, with an area of 68,000 square miles and an estimated population of 650,000, has now moved to unite with Somalia. Few, if any, observers of the territory had predicted that it would become self-governing before 1962 or 1963. In fact, a program of training for independence did not really get under way until May 1956, when Britain made a qualified commitment for independence. The qualifications were removed in February 1959, when the Foreign Office announced that Her Majesty's Government would grant the territory its independence and would not obstruct its unification with Somalia.

British rule over Somaliland was established between 1884 and 1886 after the withdrawal of Egyptian forces which were there as a check to the Sudanese Mahdi. The boundaries were delimited by 1897 by a number of treaties, the most important of which was the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Convention, which ceded 25,000 square miles of the Somali-inhabited region (now known as the Haud and Reserved Area) to Ethiopia. The Convention was a *quid pro quo* for Ethiopia's assistance in preventing the transit of arms to the Sudan. An incipient type of Somali nationalism emerged soon afterward when Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah Hassan (the "Mad Mullah") fought a 20-year *jihad* (1899-1920) against the "infidel" powers. Prior to World War II, administration was based on the principle of *laissez faire*.

Somalization Has Been Slow

An Advisory Council (composed essentially of traditional leaders) was established in 1946, but it was not until 1953, with the establishment of local councils, that attempts were made to introduce modern political institutions. A Legislative Council with minimal powers, which was formed in 1957, did not blossom into an elected legislature based on universal male suffrage until February 1960. During May of this year, all six district commissioners of the territory were somalized, but central administration is still in the main staffed by British and Indian civil servants. During the last four years the educational program has been significantly expanded with the aim of providing Somali personnel for all major administrative posts by 1962. In 1956, there were about 1,700 pupils and in 1959, about 3,100. By the end of this year there will be about 200 Somalis from Somaliland studying abroad, compared with 60 in 1956.

If the overall rate of development seems slow in comparison with that of Somalia, it is primarily because Britain had no target date for granting independence. British officials believed that, in view of the high degree

of tribalism, their approach should be one of cautious change. Furthermore, the Protectorate was caught in the tangle of foreign relations. Up to 1956, the Foreign Office seemed to be committed to *rapprochement* with Ethiopia. Given Ethiopia's anxiety over a Pan-Somali movement, the Colonial Office was inclined to proceed slowly in structuring the institutional bases for Somali nationalism.

The turning point came in 1955 when Britain announced the transfer to Ethiopia of the Haud and Reserved Area of Somaliland, which Britain had been administering since 1941. The announcement was immediately interpreted by the British Somalis as a "betrayal" of Britain's obligations, and a National United Front, made up of members of the Somali Youth League, the Somali National League, and traditional chiefs, was formed to protest against the transfer. The relatively unknown protectorate now found that it had a sympathetic English press and a pro-Somali lobby in Parliament—particularly after reports of Ethiopian "maltreatment" of British Somalis began to reach London. The Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, subsequently noted that the basis of the transfer existed in the "unfortunate" 1897 treaty, which "suffered from our limited knowledge of Somaliland at the time." It was a historical *faux pas* which Cairo could not avoid taking advantage of in its Somali broadcasts.

Other Sources of Nationalism

But the sources of British Somali nationalism were not confined to the bitter reaction which the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement evinced; the transfer had only crystallized an underlying sentiment, albeit confined to the "elite." British Somali sailors and merchants (estimated at 3,000) had long been in contact with Western ideas. British Somalis had aided the Somali Youth League in Mogadiscio in drafting its demands for independence before the Council of For-

Somaliland students and their teacher



Moslem judges in Somaliland —UN

eign Ministers in 1948. A petition by the Somali National League asking for unification of all the Somali areas, submitted to the United Nations in 1948, is a forerunner of its 1958 petition for unification with Somalia. Nationalism was also given a boost by British colonial officials with pro-Somali sympathies. But perhaps the most important contributing factor was the magnetic pull of Somalia's rapid political advancement.

Liabilities Numerous

Ex-British Somaliland now enters statehood with a number of liabilities. Political leadership has not had an opportunity to develop. The political parties have not been as active as those in Somalia and have only recently sought to operate beyond the towns. The number of Somali administrative and technical personnel lags sharply behind that in Somalia but those now in service have had substantial training. Economically, the territory is not highly developed; slightly more than 90 percent of the population is nomadic or semi-nomadic. Besides an annual public budget deficit of about £4,500,000—made up in the past by UK grants-in-aid—there is a prospect of un-

(Continued on page 15)

—UN

Agriculture Gains From Four Loans

FOUR developmental loans aimed primarily at expanding and diversifying agricultural production in central and eastern Africa took the economic headlines this month. Three of these were from the World Bank, and represent a new departure in that organization's lending policy. Until very recently—i.e. until the \$7,000,000 loan to the Belgian Congo in April for expansion of opportunities for Congolese farmers—the Bank has lent to African countries only for basic investments such as power, roads, mines and railways. The fourth loan, to Tanganyika, was also a milestone in that it is the International Finance Corporation's first investment on the African continent.

• On June 17 the World Bank lent the equivalent of \$15,500,000 to the Sudan to help finance completion of the Managil irrigation scheme, a project aimed at irrigating some 830,000 acres of land between the Blue and White Nile Rivers. It is anticipated that production of cotton, grain, and other crops on the completed Managil extension of the Gezira Scheme will provide 50,000 additional farmers and their families with a livelihood and result in a 10 percent annual increase in the value of Sudan's total agricultural output.

The Managil project got underway in 1957, and the Government of the Sudan has already financed, from its own resources, the development of some 585,000 acres and the settlement of nearly 28,000 farmers. The major works yet to be undertaken consist of about 160 miles of major canals and a distribution network of minor canals and laterals covering several thousand miles. About 140 miles of branch railway lines will be built to serve the newly-irrigated

area, and some 60 diesel locomotives and 900 freight cars will be added to the system. Cotton gins in the area will be increased by about 30 percent. Office buildings and houses for the operating and servicing agencies are yet to be constructed, and a system of dirt roads will be built throughout the area.

This last 1959-62 phase of the Managil Scheme will cost about \$49,000,000, of which the Bank loan will cover most of the foreign exchange costs and the Sudan Government the remainder. The target date for completion is the end of 1962.

• A \$9,000,000 project aimed at ending Tanganyika's dependence on sugar imports and opening up 7,000 acres of fertile land in the remote Kilombero Valley was made public on June 3. The project, to be undertaken by the Kilombero Sugar Company, Ltd., is being mainly financed by the International Finance Corporation, the Colonial Development Corporation, the Netherlands Overseas Finance Company, and the Standard Bank of South Africa.

The KSC enterprise, hailed by Tanganyika's principal political leader Julius Nyerere as a tribute to the political stability of the area, will grow and mill sugar cane and produce refined sugar for the Tanganyika market. The sugar mill is to be constructed at the northern end of the valley, on the Great Ruaha River and adjacent to the Selous Game Preserve. A branch rail line is being built from the main central line of the East African system southward to Mikumi, 20 miles from the mill site; eventually the branch line will be extended to the mill and on up the valley.

Initial capacity of the mill and refinery will be 20,000 tons of refined sugar per year, with expansion to 30,000 anticipated as soon as the market demand justifies. Production is expected to begin in 1962.

This is not only the International Finance Corporation's first investment in Africa, but also the first time it has joined with an international consortium of development companies. The IFC, an affiliate of the World Bank, assists in financing productive private enterprises, without the government guarantees required by the World Bank, in instances where capi-

tal is not available on reasonable terms.

• Two loans of \$5,600,000 each, earmarked for the development of African agriculture in Southern Rhodesia and in Kenya, have also been announced by the World Bank. Both Kenyan and Southern Rhodesian projects continue existing programs aimed at resettling African farmers on viable units of land and at improving agricultural productivity by replacing traditional farming methods. Both loans have been criticized by Africans on the grounds that they implicitly endorse the existing land distribution systems in the two white-governed states.

• The loan to Southern Rhodesia will help cover the foreign exchange requirements of implementing through 1962 certain measures begun under the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. This Act provides for permanent settlement of farmers on arable lands with individual rights and responsibilities, and with grazing rights in communal grazing areas. The program involves surveying and assessing arable and grazing land, allocation of individual plots and settlement areas, provision of water supplies, construction of farm-to-market roads, soil conservation measures, and improvement of such auxiliary services as agricultural research, demonstration, extension, credit, and marketing.

• The Kenya program, the Swynnerton Plan, was begun in 1955, and will be accelerated during the next three years ending June 1963. The program involves completion of land consolidation and registration of land rights; assisting farmers to modernize their farms by extension services, model farms, schools, and extension of farm loans; assisting farmers to develop cash crops, develop milk cattle, and improve their beef cattle; development of farm water supplies; organizing and expanding marketing and processing cooperatives; and building or rebuilding 23 feeder and combination feeder and through roads totalling 564 miles through African agricultural areas. The total cost of the agricultural and road projects is an estimated \$16,900,000 of which the Bank's loan will cover most of the foreign exchange requirements.

—Norman W. Mosher



Work proceeds on Sudan's Managil irrigation scheme

French-Speaking Teachers Needed in Guinea

The Guinea Government has asked the African-American Institute to recruit and screen French-speaking teachers of physics, mathematics, chemistry, natural sciences, and English, for service at the secondary level beginning September 1960. All interested persons should contact the Teacher Placement Service of the African-American Institute, 505 Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.

Four Critiques of U. S. Policy in Africa

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

On the whole, Africa has been better served by its friends in America than have other continents. Among the groups striving to influence American foreign policy, there exists almost unanimous agreement that the native African peoples must be permitted to gain their independence and shape their own destinies, and that we should do all we can to help them find themselves without demanding in exchange that they remake themselves in our social or political image.

The most recent statements of this position are in the newly-created Africa League's *A New American Policy Toward Africa* (New York: The Africa League, 360 Riverside Drive, February 1960, Editorial Committee: David Apter, Elliot Berg, Rupert Emerson, Ruth Schachter, Immanuel Wallerstein), 29 pp., and in Adlai E. Stevenson's "The New Africa, A Guide and a Proposal," *Harper's*, May 1960. In addition, Peter Ritner, formerly feature editor of the *Saturday Review*, drives these views to wild extremes in closing his furiously indignant book, *The Death of Africa*, reviewed elsewhere in this department. But in later years we shall probably trace the philosophic origins of our post-independence African policies to the Herskovits Report: *United States Foreign Policy, Africa*, a study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate by Dr. Melville Herskovits, director of the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University, (86th Cong., 1st Sess., Comm. Print, USGPO, 1959), 84 pp. (For excerpts, see *Africa Special Report*, November 1959 and March 1960).

Agreement on the "Cold War"

If these commentators have their way, the United States can avoid the internecine struggles among crusaders, militarists, and vested exploitative interests that characterized the development—indeed the decline—of American policy toward Latin America and the Far East.

All four of these studies agree that Africa should not be pressed into the cold war. Mr. Stevenson says, "I do not have in mind a specific African commitment to support the west in a power conflict." The Africa League, an African-oriented "Foreign Policy Association" concerned with relating the accumulated knowledge of academicians to the needs of policy makers, warns that "our policy for Africa must be examined in terms of the problems of Africa, and not as a mere by-product of our relations with the Soviet Union or Western Europe." The Herskovits Report recommends that "the US

should recognize that for African states a policy of nonalignment (sic) is in the best interests of the West and of Africa." And Mr. Ritner articulates an increasingly acceptable judgment about our previous strategy: "... we have failed to buy 'security' with the arms race."

Four conclusions follow. We must regard the interests of native Africans as paramount at all times. We must permit—and, in fact, expect—African governments to develop along oligarchic, authoritarian lines, at least in the near future. We must encourage the drive for unity and for larger, co-operative political entities. To these ends, we must assist the emerging states with loans, grants, and personnel in the full knowledge that immediate returns—economic, moral, and political—will probably not be forthcoming.

Divergence Noted

To be sure, the writers diverge and sometimes contradict on the strategy involved. If pressed, for example, on the question of alignment, all would implicitly agree that in the long run "free association" with the West is preferable to positive and permanent neutralism. Mr. Stevenson calls this a "main aim" of American policy. Mr. Ritner foresees "a shoulder-to-shoulder partnership with a fattened-up Community and Commonwealth." But the writers disagree on tactics. The Herskovits group merely proposes that "efforts should be made to develop regional arrangements, roughly analogous to the Colombo Plan." The Africa League is the most diffident on this score, though in another sense more determined, stating, "Many African nations will want to continue cultural and other ties with European nations. Provided these ties are the result of the willing agreement of both sides, no one can or will object."

There are other—possibly curious—minor differences. The Herskovits group demands timetables for independence, while the Africa League does not mention them. Where the League asks for a Marshall Plan for Africa, the Herskovits group prefers a more international operation, such as a Colombo Plan. Mr. Stevenson mentions a cost to the West of perhaps a billion dollars a year. Mr. Ritner pushes the figure to 6 or 8 billion.

Except for Mr. Ritner—who also demands an American governmental Institute of African Affairs to administer his multi-billion dollar aid program, plus a boycott of South African and Portuguese goods, plus a UN invasion of South West Africa and an Anglo-American expeditionary force to invade South Africa and salvage what remains after the revolution there—all the writers have

analyzed the important political and social forces in Africa in a hard-headed and rational manner. Consequently, they make eminently sensible and practical suggestions. Without making invidious comparisons, it appears that the Africa League has been able to summarize the most incisive and convincing case (in an amazingly small space). The League also makes a special contribution to the study of inter-African and international relations.

Intervention Defined

For instance, on the question of intervention in the internal affairs of other states, a problem that is particularly acute in territories not (yet) ruled by "the modern African elite", the League observes that the United States must divorce its policies from notions that bound diplomacy in the nineteenth century. "A country as powerful as ours intervenes whenever it acts or does not act." To raise the problem of sovereignty, therefore, does not end discussion; it merely inserts a factor to be weighed against others in making decisions. It is possible to forecast that, in practice, as the League notes in another context, "the legitimacy of popular backing takes precedence over legality."

Secondly, on the general question of priorities in American foreign policy, the League places Africa squarely in the middle of an effort to reorient national attitudes. "Priority to the European regional alliance was a hangover from a past phase of the cold war, when our strategy assumed a military clash with the Soviet Union." The struggle "is becoming one in which the developed powers—particularly Russia and the United States—must justify their systems and their values to the leaders of the underdeveloped nations." We may conclude that only a complete reevaluation of our view of international political reality will suffice.

Caveat Proposed

Space permits only this caveat: granted that contemporary comment on our Africa policy refreshes the public mind, the question remains whether we fully accept the implications of a wholly independent Africa. Would the Africa League continue to support "the modern African elite" if that elite did not "breed large and cohesive interest groups which can be the sources of support for nationwide parties . . ."? We understand that "political opposition and national disintegration often appear to be closely linked," but must we—shall we—support the deliberate construction of centralized socialist societies? Perhaps the rapid development and integration of African societies along the

lines that seem to be forming will permanently preclude private interest groups and competitive democracy.

Africa Today—and Tomorrow by John Hatch, (New York: Praeger, 1960), 289 pages.

It's time we recognize the end of the line for "introductions to Africa." No one will surpass the sensationalism of the aforementioned Peter Ritner's *The Death of Africa*—febrile, gloomy, full of orgiastic visions. Similarly, it seems pointless to go on duplicating old-fashioned constitutional and political histories and resumes of current events (mainly in British territories), such as John Hatch's *Africa Today—and Tomorrow*.

Events have overtaken the descriptions contained in the region-by-region survey occupying the middle pages of both works. Although the authors offer a few shrewd comments on history and current activity, we no longer need to be treated as strangers to a continent whose troubles assault us daily in the newspapers. We require explanatory generalizations that synthesize journalistic reports and scholarly studies, perhaps like Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*—a book that has inspired few successors and received lamentably little attention from the general public.

Mr. Hatch states that he has written "a simple outline book, based on lectures, mostly to adult students." The beginner, however, may lose the thread amid the wealth of historical detail. In addition, Mr. Hatch undermines his purpose in the United States by directing his discussion largely to a British audience. He delves deeply into constitutional processes peculiar to British overseas policy, emerging with a consistent *New Statesman*-like interpretation—both of which exercises may tax the American reader.

The Death of Africa by Peter Ritner, (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 312 pages.

Mr. Ritner distinctly addresses himself to "the Big Picture," which for him, however, reflects a surrealist image. Terribly impressed by social disorganization, he describes an Africa gripped by a degenerative pathology: "a historical monstrosity . . . a center of chaos . . . a seething slum" developing on "deformed and diseased lines," racked "by convulsion and disruption . . . a place of deracinated tribalism," headed for a "farrago of misfortune." Far more significant than the familiar variety of social, economic and political problems is the fact that the "phasing" of technological and social change is askew.

Despite some weird prose configurations, Mr. Ritner makes some useful points on this score. He fails, however, to illuminate when he links

trends in Africa to a kind of historical necessity. The author would have us compare the development of "Technological Civilization" in Africa with the "phasing of the [same] historical process" in the United States, where "Technology" had time and space "gradually to knit together . . . a more or less non-self-conflicting social fabric."

At least three errors leap from this approach. First, it is inaccurate to assume that agreement exists on a standard of social health, by which one can judge the condition of past and future societies. Secondly, it is inaccurate to talk about a process of history as if patterns of previous occurrences were universal and uniform. Finally, the mind boggles at discerning the American "non-self-conflicting social fabric." If this means that the United States experienced no grave social warfare, it is wrong. And if it means that it took a long time for us to evolve into a reasonably stable society, then it is trite—and, in fact, applies to Africa as well.

One suspects that Mr. Ritner really wanted to do a book about the decline of the West, rather than about Africa, for his most redolent critique engulfs the motives and actions of the European colonialists and American politicians. Significantly, his dire predictions—military dictatorship, intermittent warfare among regional confederations, a blood bath in South Africa, chaos and "Chinification" on the African Continent—follow a tumultuous discussion of the sagging "American Posture." All this acts as a springboard for the staggering program already outlined. For Mr. Ritner, Africa is America's conscience. He may want to help Africa, but fundamentally he yearns to revitalize American life.

SHORT NOTES:

1. Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg, editors, *Cultures and Societies of Africa* (New York: Random House, 1960), 614 pp. A fine collection of readings, primarily for use in introductory courses in college, but suitable for interested laymen. Requisite fields in anthropology are represented by reputable authorities. The Ottenbergs provide a lucid survey of what anthropologists know about Africa in their introductory essay.

2. *The American Negro Writer and His Roots*, Selected Papers from the First Conference of Negro Writers, March 1959 (New York: American Society of African Culture, 1960), 71 pp. The reader enters the "culture prison" created by America for its Negroes and cannot help but be struck by the terrible pain and torment imposed by the white society.

3. Helen F. Conover, compiler, *Official Publications of French West Africa 1946-1958, A Guide* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress,

1960), 88 pp. A useful bibliography, available for 75¢ from the Card Division, Library of Congress.

4. Two new periodicals: *The Institute of Race Relations News Letter* (London: 6 Duke of York St., W. 1), monthly, #1, April 1960. "Comments on major events and trends in race relations throughout the world." *Africa 1960* (London: distributed in the United States by African Research and Development Co., 75 E. 55 St., New York 22), fortnightly, #6, April 8, 1960. A sort of "Kiplinger Newsletter" for Africa, marked confidential. Contains a great deal of self-styled, but useful, "inside" information.

5. Two recent articles deserve attention: "Harry Oppenheimer's Industrial Africa," *Fortune*, May 1960. The fabulous story of one of the world's richest business combines, Anglo-American Corp.-DeBeers Consolidated Mines. Valuable for its outline of the precise size and extent of an economic empire that plays a crucial role in the future of southern Africa. Thomas Sterling, "Nine Decades After Stanley," *The New Yorker*, May 14 and 21, 1960. A fascinating description of a recent journey in the footsteps of Henry M. Stanley's expedition, from Zanzibar to the mouth of the Congo. Stylish, perceptive, and compassionate; highlighted by the author's experience as a guest in one of the African suburbs of Stanleyville.

"Africa Special Report" is published by the African-American Institute, a private, non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia and devoted to establishing closer bonds between the peoples of Africa and the United States. Other activities of the Institute include scholarship programs, teacher placement in Africa, and a variety of lecture, information and visitor services.

HEADQUARTERS: 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

Washington Office: Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 4, D. C.

West Africa Office: P.O. Box 3192, Accra, Ghana.

Board of Trustees

President: Dr. Emory Ross, missionary and consultant on Africa.

Chairman: Harold K. Hochschild, Honorary Chairman of the Board of the American Medical Clinics Inc.

Vice Chairman: Judge Edward R. Dudley, former United States Ambassador to Liberia.

Executive Vice President: Loyd V. Shere, former United States Minister-Consul General.

Treasurer: Landis K. Christle, President of the Liberia Mining Company.

Secretary: E. Ladd Thurston, Washington Attorney.

Other Members of the Board: Elia Meier Barnett, Lecture recitalist; Dr. Harace Mann Bond, President Emeritus, Lincoln University; Chester Bowles, former United States Ambassador to India; Dr. Gray Cowan, Columbia University; Dana S. Crael, Director, Rockefeller Brothers Fund; John W. Davis, Special Director, Teacher Information and Security, Legal Defense and Educational Fund (New York); William Leo Hansberry, Professor of African History, Howard University; Alan Pifer, Executive Associate, Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Staff

New York Office: Loyd V. Shere, Executive Vice President; Donald M. Wyatt, Executive Associate.

Washington Office: Gordon P. Hagberg, Director; Harry Heintzen, Deputy Director; Bruce McGovern, Staff Associate; Carvin Jefferson, Staff Associate.

West African Office: E. Jefferson Murphy, Director; Wilbur Jones, Staff Associate.

Africa House Governing Council: William Leo Hansberry, Chairman; William Seon, Secretary; Mrs. Henrietta Van Noy, Member.

Republic of Somalia

(Continued from page 11)

favorable gaps in the balance of trade (£2,300,000 in 1959). Ninety percent of exports (hides, skins, sheep, and goats) are shipped to Aden and 70 percent of imports come from the Commonwealth areas. Since its establishment, the Colonial Development and Welfare Corporation has granted the territory £4,500,000; of this, £1,500,000 is allocated for 1960-1962.

Political Parties and Prospects

The main political party in Somaliland is the Somali National League, which traces its origins to a social club (NADI) formed in 1935. Led by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, a 31-year-old English-educated son of a merchant, the League is regarded as "modernist." It alone among the parties has advocated suffrage for women, and it has consistently opposed official representation by traditional leaders in the central organs of government. By 1958, it had seized the initiative in promoting the Pan-Somali movement in the Protectorate. Its foreign policy orientation appears to have an underlying pro-Egyptian sentiment, but Britain's grant of independence may resuscitate in the party some of its earlier pro-British orientation.

Somali National League Wins

In the February 1960 elections the Somali National League won 20 of the 33 elected member seats and 52 percent of the votes cast. It was joined in the campaign—and in the Legislative Council—by the United Somali Party (organized in September 1959) which received 16.4 percent of the votes and 12 seats. Perhaps more so than in Somalia, the agnatic cleavages penetrate the party system. Hence, the SNL derives its main strength from the Habr Yunis (Ishaak); the UPS from the Esa and Darod, and the NUF from some sections of the Habr Toljalla and Habr Awal (Ishaak). In contrast to Somalia, there is no effective, nationally organized party.

The elections delivered a major blow to the National United Front, which has existed since 1955, but organized as a party only in 1959. Although it won 24.8 percent of the votes, it gained only one seat and this by the Christian Somali, Michael Mariano, who had headed the British Somali delegation to London to protest against the Haud and Reserved Area transfer. By 1957, the Somali National League was able to pin on the National United Front a pro-administration and "traditionalist" label. The Front formed a coalition with the Somali Youth League in the campaign, but was not encouraged by Somalia's SYL and failed to gain a single seat.

III. The Union

Despite the clan-family and political party differences between the two Somali areas, the traditional and party leaders have been united on the goal of independence and unification, especially during the last few months. On the general level, some major accomplishments have been attained. The two territories have agreed to dissolve their legislatures and amalgamate in a single National Assembly to be located at Mogadiscio. The Assembly will elect a president who will invite the prime minister to form a government. Agreement has been reached on a National Army of 5,000 men, which will include the National Army of Somalia (four battalions of 1,000 men each) and the Somaliland Scouts (one battalion).

As a tentative administrative arrangement, Somaliland will be divided into two provinces and joined with the six provinces of Somalia. The Somali Youth League of Somalia and the Somali National League and the United Somali Party of Somaliland have agreed that they will assume the political leadership of the Union and act jointly on all matters affecting the union of all Somali territories. In one important respect, these agreements may represent an advance of "modernism" over "traditionalism" since some observers have claimed that the Ishaak, who are the majority in Somaliland and who claim to have closer connections with the lineage of the Prophet than other Somali clan-families, could never accept an arrangement in which Mogadiscio would be the center of activities.

Many Problems Ahead

However, independence poses new and profound problems. The two territories have been operating under different systems of law (English law and Italian code) and administration—though the differences in the latter are not so great as they appear on paper. Other major questions have to be solved: the official language (Italian has been more widely used in Somalia than has English in Somaliland); the civil services (pensions, salaries, recruitment); integration of ministries; and a common currency and financial system.

Italian and British procedures in the latter two areas differ widely. There are approximately 320 British and Indian civil servants in Somaliland, some of whom are now seeking transfer or retirement. There is the further question of sources of financial and technical aid and how they can best be coordinated. The educational systems of the two territories

will have to be integrated and reorganized, since they have developed along different patterns. It seems, further, that a heavier financial burden will fall on Somalia's resources since it is the more economically advanced of the two territories.

Border Crises Loom

But the most serious problem which Somalia and Somaliland will face is the question of the Haud and Reserved Area and the Somalia-Ethiopia boundary dispute. One-half of the population of Somaliland grazes its livestock in the Haud and Reserved Area during five to nine months of the year; it is the vital lifeline of the nomads. The 1897 Convention, which allows trans-frontier grazing, may still bind Ethiopia, but the 1954 Agreement allowing British officials to administer and protect the British Somalis in the transferred area will terminate. It is possible that the educational and health facilities which the British have been able to provide in the area may also come to an end. The Somalis can negotiate with Ethiopia for a new treaty, but, given the disparity in power, probably not on equal terms. If the Haud and Reserved Area is cut off, the pressure put on the meager resources of Somaliland would be conducive to conflict.

Nor is the situation along the Somalia-Ethiopian frontier any more sanguine. The present boundary was drawn by Britain and Ethiopia as the "provisional line" in 1948. This provisional line, which Italy did not accept as binding, cuts through Somali ethnic groups. But thus far it has not occasioned the series of conflicts which has occurred in the Haud and Reserved Area. Both Somalis and Ethiopians, under UN persuasion, have committed themselves to arbitration; neither side, however, has shown any serious disposition to reconcile the controversy. As far as the Haud and Reserved Area is concerned, the Somalis have never accepted the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty on the grounds that it "conflicted with the protectorate treaties" signed between Somali chiefs and Britain. The legal aspects of both disputes are subordinate to the conflicting nationalistic claims. The Somali ethnic line, which runs deep into Ethiopian territory, is for the Somalis the real and long-range point at issue. Ethiopia feels that it cannot compromise its present position lest this be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Somalia and Somaliland are thus saddled with the multifarious problems of creating economic viability, resolving complex—if not insuperable—boundary disputes, and maintaining political stability. And they emerge as independent states while other Somalis are still under foreign rule.

Visitors

GRACE OFORI-ATTA, Organizer of Children's Library Work, Ghana Library Board, Accra, here on a 90-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D. C.

KWA OWUNA HAGAN, National Secretary of the Ghana People's Education Association, here on a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Concluding itinerary: Yellowstone National Park, July 10-12; Chicago, July 13-20; Hammond, July 20-23; Monteagle (Tenn.), July 23-30; Washington, D. C., July 30-August 2; New York, August 2-9. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

AKILULU DADI, Director General of the Ethiopian Ministry of National Community Development, Addis Ababa, here on a 120-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1722 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D. C.

CHRISTIAAN WILLEM PRINSLOO, Chief Information Officer for the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Union of South Africa, here on a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

ARMANDO SALBANY, Chief of Agro-Pastoral extension work for the Development Fund, Luanda, Angola, here on a 120-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

KAMIL ABUSEIPH, Director of Works, Ministry of Works, Sudan, here on a US State Department leader exchange grant. Concluding itinerary: Grand Canyon, July 10; Glen Canyon Dam, July 11; Phoenix, July 11-13; San Francisco, July 13-14; New York, July 15. July 15-23, to be arranged. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

JEAN CAMARA, Chief of President Sekou Toure's Secretariat and deputy of the Guinea National Assembly; and DIOMBA MARA, deputy of the Guinea National Assembly, here on US State Department leader exchange grants. Concluding itinerary: San Juan, July 9-16; Atlanta, July 16-19; New York, July 19-25. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

DUNCAN NDEGWA, Assistant Secretary of the Kenya Treasury, here with his family on a US State Department specialist grant. Itinerary: New York, July 24-August 14; San Juan, August 14-21; St. Louis, August 21-25; San Francisco, August 25-Sept. 4; Denver, Sept. 5-11; Chicago, Sept. 11-18; Ann Arbor, Sept. 18-21; Buffalo, Sept. 21-23; Albany, Sept. 23-28; Boston, Sept. 28-Oct. 3; Washington, D. C., Oct. 3-4. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

Four Guineans are here until October 13 on US State Department specialist grants: SOULEYMANE BEN-DAOUDA TOURE, Chief of ground traffic services at Conakry airport; GUY GUICHARD, Chief of traffic services for Conakry; and EL HADJ MAMADOU CAMARA, Chief of the Central Garage, Conakry—all divisions of the Security Service, Ministry of Defense and Security. The fourth, JOHN KEITA, is Chief of the Asphalt Section, Ministry of Public Works. They are programmed by the American Council on Education.

ALEXANDER CUMMINGS, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Public Instruction, Liberia, here until August on a US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

GILBERT OKEKE, Minister of Education for the Eastern Region of Nigeria, here until August on a US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

REV. HARRY SAWYERR, Dean of the Faculty of Theology, Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone, here until August on a US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

P. W. G. GROENEWOUD, Rector of the University of the Orange Free State, Union of South Africa, here until August on a US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

Peripatetic Subscribers Please Note:

Many subscribers have written us to report temporary changes-of-address for the summer months. This is virtually impossible from a bookkeeping point of view, and we would recommend instead that you make arrangements to have your copies of *Africa Special Report* forwarded during temporary absences. If you cannot do this, please submit one change of address at a time.

Calendar

August 9-22: Eighth Council of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY). Accra, Ghana.

September 5-7: Third Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, in Hartford, Connecticut, to discuss "Patterns and Problems of Unification in Africa". For details, contact William A. Hance, Executive Secretary, African Studies Association, 409 West 117th Street, New York 27, N.Y.

September 19-22: Meeting of the International Institute of Differing Civilizations, in Munich, Germany, to discuss "Staff Problems in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries". Participants include Georges Balandier, Director of Studies, *Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*; James S. Coleman, Director of African Studies Center, University of California at Los Angeles; Sir Sydney Caine, Director, London School of Economics; Gabriel d'Arboussier, former president of the *Grand Conseil de l'Afrique occidentale française*; and Charles Ammoun, Lebanese delegate at UNESCO. For details, contact Institut International des Civilisations Differentes, 11, Boulevard de Waterloo, Brussels, Belgium.

(If you would like to have a visitor from Africa or an event concerning Africa South of the Sahara listed in *Africa Special Report*, please send details to *Africa Special Report*, Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.)

INDIANA UNIV LIBRARY
ORDER DEPT
BLOOMINGTON IND

